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WHO IS ACTUALLY CALLING THE SHOTS? 
WATCH OUT, THEY MAY NOT BE LIABLE: IRVIN V. SMITH 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The medical field has undergone tremendous changes with the advent of 
new medical technologies over the years.1  Today, a doctor can communicate 
with both patients and colleagues across the country via telephones, e-mail, 
cellular phones, and fax machines. Rural doctors, who were once limited to 
their own expert knowledge or reference to medical handbooks, now can 
quickly consult with specialized doctors who can help in patient evaluations.  
With these increases in technology, however, traditional physician-patient 
relationships are no longer easily defined.2  Since a physician-patient 
relationship is a prerequisite for professional malpractice claims against 
doctors, “courts face new challenges in drawing the line between non-liability 
and a duty of care.”3   
Some courts are reluctant to find a physician-patient relationship between a 
patient and a consulting doctor who has been contacted by the treating 
physician via telephone.4  In those cases, courts have found the consultation to 
be merely “informal” because the consultant’s involvement with the patient 
was only to answer a colleague’s inquiry.5  Many of these courts reason that 
finding such a relationship would “stifle communication, education, and 
professional association, all to the detriment of the patient.”6  Most courts 
agree that while a formal consultation is required for a physician-patient 
relationship, the consultation does not have to include direct patient contact.7  
 
 1. Sharon M. Glenn, Liability in the Absence of a Traditional Physician-Patient 
Relationship: What Every “On Call” Doctor Should Know: Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial 
Hospital, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747 (1993). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes a Physician Patient Relationship 
for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4th 132 § 9 (1982). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l Hosp., 277 Ill.App.3d 80, 86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).  See also 
Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Hill by Burston v. Kokosky, 186 
Mich. App. 300, 306 (1990); Rainer v. Grossman, 31 Cal.App.3d 539, 543-44 (1973). 
 7. Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 270 Kan. 824, 835 (Kan. 2001); St. John v. Pope, 
901 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. 1995); Lection v. Dyll, 65 S.W.3d 696, 704 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); 
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Courts have analyzed the consultant’s level of involvement when considering 
the existence of a formal consultation.8  Recently, the Kansas Supreme Court, 
in Irvin v. Smith, refused to extend the physician-patient relationship between 
a consulting physician and the patient despite the consultant’s high level of 
involvement in the patient’s case.9  The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that a 
formal consultation requires a personal examination of the patient.10 
Part II of this note outlines the Irvin v. Smith case.  Part III examines the 
history of the physician-patient relationship.  Part IV summarizes the Majority 
and Dissenting Opinions in Irvin v. Smith.  Finally, Part V analyzes the case’s 
holding, dissent, and impact on the future of the physician-patient relationship. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Ashley Irvin was born with a condition known as hydrocephalus, which 
causes a build up of cerebrospinal fluid in the skull.11  Left untreated, the 
excess fluid would exert too much pressure on the brain and kill a 
hydrocephalic.12  However, the surgical placement of a ventriculoperitoneal or 
“VP” shunt will drain the excess fluid from the skull into the abdomen where it 
is reabsorbed into the body.13 
At age two, Ashley had a “VP” shunt surgically placed by Dr. Edwin 
MacGee, a neurosurgeon.14  As long as the “VP” shunt worked properly, 
Ashley was able to live a normal life.15  However, twice in her early childhood, 
Ashley had to undergo surgery to keep the shunt working properly.16 
On October 15, 1995, twelve-year-old Ashley was taken to Bob Wilson 
Memorial Hospital in Ulysses, Kansas after experiencing a number of 
symptoms, including neck and back pain, nausea, and seizures.17  Three days 
later, Ashley was then transported by life flight to St. Luke’s Hospital in 
Kansas City, Missouri for an examination by Dr. MacGee to determine if 
Ashley’s shunt was working properly.18  X-rays were taken of Ashley’s chest 
and abdomen, which were examined by an unidentified radiologist and Dr. 
 
Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 305 (citing Dougherty v. Gifford 826 S.W.2d 668, 674-75 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1992)). 
 8. James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes a Physician Patient Relationship 
for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4th 132 § 9 (1982). 
 9. Irvin v. Smith,  31 P.3d 934 (Kan. 2001). 
 10. Irvin, 31 P.3d at 942. 
 11. Id. at 938. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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Karen Divelbliss.19  The radiologist told Dr. MacGee that two inches of the 
shunt tubing remained in the abdomen.20  Additionally, Dr. Divelbliss’s official 
reading of the x-ray showed nothing wrong with the shunt.21  Therefore, 
Ashley was sent home on October 21, and Dr. MacGee informed Ashley’s 
pediatrician, Dr. Michael Shull, in Garden City, Kansas that the shunt appeared 
to be working properly.22 
On November 12, Ashley again began experiencing neck and back pain, 
nausea, and seizures.23  She was admitted to St. Catherine’s Hospital in Garden 
City, Kansas.24  Dr. Shull examined Ashley and ordered x-rays to be taken of 
Ashley’s chest and abdomen to again rule out a shunt malfunction.25  The 
radiologist at St. Catherine’s examined the x-rays and reported that there was 
no malfunction.26  Although the radiologist reported that no abnormalities were 
present in the x-rays, Dr. Shull was still worried about a possible shunt 
malfunction.27  Therefore, Dr. Shull ordered an MRI of Ashley’s brain to check 
for increased intracranial pressure.28  The MRI, however, was negative.29 
On November 13, Dr. Shull consulted Dr. MacGee regarding Ashley’s 
symptoms.30  Dr. MacGee expressed his opinion that the shunt was working 
properly and instructed Dr. Shull to prescribe hydration and seizure control 
medication to help alleviate her symptoms.31  Yet, Ashley continued to 
experience the symptoms despite the medication.32  Dr. Shull contacted Dr. 
Smith, a pediatric intensivist at Wesley Medical Center in Witchita, Kansas.33  
Dr. Shull informed Dr. Smith of Ashley’s condition, her present symptoms, 
and the possibility of a shunt malfunction.34  On November 14, with Dr. 
Smith’s approval, Dr. Shull ordered Ashley’s transfer from St. Catherine’s 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. At trial, the x-rays taken at St. Luke’s showed the shunt tubing was pulled up into the 
abdomen wall which intermittently blocked the flow of cranial fluid into the abdominal cavity.  
Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  at 938. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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Hospital to Wesley Medical Center in Witchita, Kansas and ordered additional 
x-rays to be sent with Ashley to Wesley Medical Center.35 
Dr. Smith admitted Ashley at Wesley Medical Center with the x-rays, but 
at trial, he testified that he could not recall whether he looked at the x-rays or 
not.36  The x-rays showed Ashley’s shunt required repair because the “tip” of 
the shunt was embedded in her abdomen wall.37  Dr. Smith did admit at trial 
that he would have known the shunt required repair had he looked at the x-
rays, but was under the belief that a radiologist at Garden City had already 
examined the x-rays and found no repair necessary.38  However, no radiologist 
at Garden City had read the additional x-rays that were sent with Ashley.39 
On November 14, Dr. Smith called Dr. Gilmartin on the telephone to 
obtain a “neurological consult.”40  Dr. Smith believed Dr. Gilmartin, a child 
neurologist, would be “the best consultant to use to help evaluate Ashley.”41  
Dr. Smith discussed Ashley’s condition and symptoms with Dr. Gilmartin, and 
both agreed a shuntogram, a procedure that “involves the injection of a 
radioactive isotope into the shunt to check for shunt blockage”, and an EEG 
should be ordered.42  Dr. Smith and Dr. Gilmartin both agreed that Ashley’s 
symptoms did not require an immediate shuntogram because Ashley appeared 
stable, alert and conscious between seizures.43  Therefore, Dr. Smith and Dr. 
Gilmartin planned to do the shuntogram the following morning, November 
15.44 
On the morning of November 15, Ashley’s condition was stable; she was 
alert, awake, and verbal.45  However at 8:45 a.m., before the shuntogram or 
EEG were performed, Ashley’s condition deteriorated requiring resuscitation 
and intubation.46  Then, over two hours later, at 11:30 a.m., Ashley’s pupils 
became dilated and unresponsive to light.47  Finally, the shuntogram was 
performed revealing the tip of the shunt was embedded in the abdomen wall.48  
Surgery was then performed to correct the shunt malfunction.49  However, it 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 938-39. 
 39. Id. at 939. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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was too late for Ashley.  Ashley had already suffered an ischemic brain injury 
due to the lack of oxygen to her brain before the shuntogram procedure was 
performed.50  Ashley’s permanent and severe brain damage keeps her from 
walking, speaking, or carrying out any daily functions.51  She has to be fed 
through a tube and requires full-time care.52 
Ashley and her parents (together “Irvin”) filed an action in Sedgwick 
County District Court against Dr. MacGee, Neurology/Neurosurgery P.C.,  Dr. 
Smith,  Dr. Gilmartin, and Wesley Medical Center.53  Irvin later added St. 
Luke’s Radiological Group, Dr. Divelbliss, and Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corporation.54  Irvin settled with Dr. MacGee and Neurology/Nuerosurgery 
P.C.55  Dr. Divelbliss was granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, and Irvin voluntarily dismissed her claim against Dr. Divelbliss’s 
employer, St. Luke’s Radiological Group.56  The district court accepted Dr. 
Gilmartin’s argument that he owed no duty to Ashley since a physician-patient 
relationship was not established, and therefore, the court granted his motion for 
summary judgment.57 
In March 1999, Irvin’s first case was tried before a jury in Sedgwick 
County against Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, Dr. Smith, and 
Wesley Medical Center.58  The trial resulted in a directed verdict in favor of 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation and a hung jury for Dr. Smith and 
Wesley Medical Center.59  After the trial, Irvin settled her claims against 
Wesley Medical Center.60 
In November 1999, Irvin’s second jury trial against St. Luke’s and Dr. 
Divelbliss resulted in a verdict of $1,770,391.08.61  However, Irvin sought the 
same damages as those claimed in the Sedgwick County action and therefore, 
filed a motion for additur or in the alternative a motion for a new trial.62  The 
district court granted the motion for the new trial and vacated the verdict.63  
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Irvin later filed a claim against both defendants in Jackson County, Missouri.  Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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Irvin subsequently settled with St. Luke’s and Dr. Divelbliss for the full 
amount of the verdict.64 
In January 2000, Irvin’s third jury trial against Dr. Smith in Sedgwick 
County resulted in a verdict of no fault on the part of Dr. Smith.65  Irvin’s 
motion for a new trial was denied.66  Irvin then appealed this verdict and the 
dismissal of Dr. Gilmartin.67  Dr. Smith also filed a cross-appeal.68  The 
Kansas Supreme Court found the district court did not err in refusing to grant 
Irvin’s motion for a new trial.69  Further, while affirming the district court’s 
decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court noted Smith’s cross-appeals were moot.70 
The Kansas Supreme Court also rejected Irvin’s argument that the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gilmartin.71  The 
Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s finding that no 
physician-patient relationship existed between Gilmartin and Irvin.72  Without 
a physician-patient relationship, Dr. Gilmartin owed no duty to Irvin, one of 
the basic elements of a medical malpractice case.73  The Kansas Supreme 
Court noted that finding a physician-patient relationship between Dr. Gilmartin 
and Irvin would discourage telephone consultations, which is against the 
public’s interest since these calls are used on a frequent basis in the medical 
field.74 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Nearly a century and a half ago, courts recognized negligence in the 
medical field as a separate tort.75  Prior to this recognition, medical malpractice 
was solely a contract action.76  Today medical malpractice is a “civil action for 
damages resulting from the negligence of a physician in treating a patient.”77  
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 940. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 947. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 942-43. 
 72. Id. at 940, 943. 
 73. Id. at 940. 
 74. Id. at 943. 
 75. Sharon M. Glenn, Liability in the Absence of a Traditional Physician-Patient 
Relationship: What Every “On Call” Doctor Should Know: Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial 
Hospital, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 752 (1993). 
 76. Sharon M. Glenn, Liability in the Absence of a Traditional Physician-Patient 
Relationship: What Every “On Call” Doctor Should Know: Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial 
Hospital, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 752 (1993). 
 77. Id. 
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The elements of a medical malpractice claim are: 1) a duty, 2) a breach of the 
duty, 3) causation, and 4) damages.78  In order to establish the element of duty, 
one must prove the existence of a physician-patient relationship.79  Absent 
such a relationship, a physician cannot be held liable for medical malpractice.80 
The existence of a physician-patient relationship requires mutual 
knowledge and consent.81  In St. John v. Pope, the Texas Supreme Court 
provided a good description of the circumstances under which a duty arises in 
medical malpractice.82  The court distinguished the duty under ordinary 
negligence from the duty required for a claim in medical malpractice.83  Under 
a general negligence theory, people have a duty to refrain from negligently 
injuring others even though no prior relationship exists.84  However, physicians 
do not owe a duty to “exercise their particular talents, knowledge, and skill on 
behalf of every person they encounter in the course of the day.”85  
Additionally, the court noted that physicians are not even required to render 
their services to everyone who asks for care.86  Furthermore, the duty only 
exists when a physician consents to a physician-patient relationship, though 
this consent may be express or implied.87  Since consent may be implied, a 
physician does not need to directly deal with a patient for a duty to exist.88  
Additionally, the “physician-patient relationship does not require the 
formalities of a contract.”89 
An increasing number of courts have found physician-patient relationships 
even when the physician has had no personal contact with the patient.90  These 
courts have noted that indirect contact with a patient will not preclude a 
physician-patient relationship.91  Therefore, some courts are now willing to 
impose liability on consulting doctors.92  However, the consulting doctor’s 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 752-53. 
 80. Id. at 753. 
 81. St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 423; Adams, 270 Kan. at 835; Reynolds, 277 Ill.App.3d at 85; 
Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 306. 
 82. St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 420. 
 83. Id. at 423. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 424. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Cogswell v. Chapman, 249 A.D.2d 865, 866-67 (N.Y.  App. Div. 1998); Adams, 270 
Kan. at 836-37; Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 715. 
 91. Adams, 270 Kan. At 835; Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 704; St. John, 901 W.E.2d at 424; 
Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 305; Dougherty, 826 S.W.2d at 674-75; Cogswell, 249 A.D.2d at 866-67. 
 92. Adams, 270 Kan. At 837; Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 715; Dougherty, 826 S.W.2d at 672, 
674. 
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level of involvement in the patient’s case often determines whether a duty is 
created.93 
In Oliver v. Brock, the consultant’s level of involvement was not enough 
for a physician-patient relationship to be created.94  The Alabama Supreme 
Court found the consulting physician did not take any part in the treatment of 
the patient.95  The physician had never seen the patient and never requested to 
serve as a consultant in the patient’s treatment.96  The attending physician had 
generally described Oliver’s injuries and treatment during a telephone 
conversation which was originated to discuss another patient’s treatment.97  
The consulting doctor did not offer any treatment advice, but merely agreed 
with the treating doctor’s opinion.98  The court found the conversation to be 
merely gratuitous and affirmed summary judgment in the physician’s favor.99 
However, almost twenty-five years after the Oliver decision, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals, in Diggs v. Arizona Cardiologists, Ltd., held that a 
cardiologist had a duty of care to the patient when the cardiologist offered an 
“informal consult.”100  In Diggs, the cardiologist consulted with an emergency 
room physician regarding a patient with severe chest pains.101  After the 
consultation, the emergency room physician released the patient, who then 
died of a heart attack three hours later.102  The court noted that generally a 
physician who provides an informal consult does not have a duty of care to the 
patient.103  However, in this case, the court found the cardiologist voluntarily 
undertook a duty of care to the patient because the cardiologist’s opinion, his 
interpretation of the electrocardiogram (EKG), was the primary factor that led 
the ER doctor to rule out a myocardial infarction.104  Further, the court relied 
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A and found that the 
consulting doctor undertook to give treatment advice to the attending doctor 
knowing that he would rely on this advice.105  Therefore, the court found that, 
 
 93. Adams, 270 Kan. At 837; Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 714-15; Cogswell, 249 A.D.2d at 866-
67. 
 94. Oliver v. Brock, 342 So.2d 1 (Ala 1976). 
 95. Id. at 5. 
 96. Id. at 4. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 4-5. 
 100. Diggs, 198 Ariz. at 198. 
 101. Id. at 200. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 203. 
 104. Id. at 202. 
 105. Id. 
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even though no contractual patient-physician relationship existed between the 
cardiologist and the patient, the cardiologist owed a duty of reasonable care.106 
Typically, as the Diggs court noted, no physician-patient relationship exists 
between the patient and the consultant if the consultant informally offers his or 
her opinion to another physician.107  In Hill v. Kokosky, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals held that a physician-patient relationship did not exist between the 
patient and the consulting physician.108  In Hill, the treating physician 
discussed the patient’s pregnancy difficulties in numerous telephone 
conversations with a consulting physician.109  The consulting doctor gave his 
opinion based on the patient’s case history as related to him by the treating 
physician.110  However, the consulting physician did not see the patient, 
examine her, or view her chart.111  The court stated that the physician’s 
opinions were “not in the nature of prescribed course of treatment” but were 
“recommendations to be accepted or rejected” by the treating physician.112  
The court compared the medical advice offered by the consultant to 
information one might find in a medical treatise or article.113  Therefore, the 
court found no physician-patient relationship existed because the consulting 
doctor had such a limited and remote connection with the patient’s case.114 
In NBD Bank v. Barry, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that no 
evidence supported a physician-patient relationship between the patient and 
consulting physician.115  In NBD Bank, the treating physician contacted the 
consulting doctor on multiple occasions to seek his opinion regarding 
treatment alternatives for the patient.116  However, the consulting doctor did 
not agree to treat the patient or to be a consultant on the case.117  Further, the 
court found the treating doctor was free to accept or reject the consulting 
doctor’s recommendations, and therefore, the consulting physician owed no 
duty of care to the patient.118 
In Reynolds v. Decatur Memorial Hosp., the Illinois Appellate Court held 
no physician-patient relationship existed between the patient and a doctor who 
 
 106. Id. at 203. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Hill by Burston, 186 Mich. App. at 300. 
 109. Id. at 302. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 304. 
 113. Id. at 305. 
 114. Id. at 305-306. 
 115. NBD Bank v. Barry, 223 Mich. App. 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
 116. Id. at 370. 
 117. Id. at 373 
 118. Id. 
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gave an informal opinion over the telephone.119  The court noted the doctor 
merely answered an inquiry from a colleague, was not contacted again, and 
charged no fee.120  The court stated the consultant was not asked to provide a 
service for the patient, conduct lab tests, review test results, or commit himself 
to further involvement with the patient.121  Therefore, the Illinois Appellate 
Court reasoned that finding a physician-patient relationship under the 
circumstances in the case would have “a chilling effect upon the practice of 
medicine.  It would stifle communication, education and professional 
association, all to the detriment of the patient.”122 
Similarly in Corbet v. McKinney, the physician’s consultation with the 
patient’s treating doctor was insufficient to establish the requisite relationship 
and duty of care.123  The Missouri Court of Appeals noted that the consulting 
physician merely offered a recommendation for treatment.124  The court stated 
that merely undertaking to advise the patient’s treating doctor as to general 
patient care is not enough for a physician-patient relationship.125  Instead, the 
court noted that undertaking to examine, diagnose, or treat the patient will give 
rise to a relationship.126  However, the court found no evidence that the 
physician contracted to provide medical services, examined the patient, or 
diagnosed the patient.127 
In Ingber v. Kandler, the New York Appellate Court, held that the 
consulting physician gave an informal opinion to a fellow physician, and 
therefore no physician-patient relationship existed.128  The court noted that the 
consulting physician did not have any contact with the patient, never saw any 
records relating the case, and did not even know the patient’s name.129 
The Texas Court of Appeals, in Lopez v. Aziz, also found no physician-
patient relationship to exist between the patient and an OB-GYN specialist 
consulted by phone by the patient’s treating physician.130  The consultant did 
not bill the patient or treating physician, did not prepare any reports or conduct 
any lab tests, did not accept any work relating to the patient’s case, and never 
contacted or examined the patient.131  The treating doctor acknowledged that 
 
 119. Reynolds, 277 Ill.App.3d at 80. 
 120. Id. at 85. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 86. 
 123. Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 124. Id. at 171. 
 125. Id. at 169-70. 
 126. Id. at 169. 
 127. Id.at 171. 
 128. Ingber v. Kandler, 128 A.D.2d 591, 591-92 (N.Y. 1987). 
 129. Id. at 592. 
 130. Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 304. 
 131. Id. at 306. 
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he was ultimately responsible for the patient’s treatment and was free to accept 
or reject the consultant’s opinion.132  Further, the court noted the consultant’s 
comments were not binding, and he had no authority or control of the course of 
the patient’s treatment.133  The court found the consulting physician merely 
answered a professional inquiry of a colleague.134 
Although most courts have found that an informal consultation does not 
give rise to a physician-patient relationship, courts have struggled with the 
complex question of when a consultant’s opinion becomes formal.  Many 
courts find informal consults when the physician has not committed to further 
involvement with patient, charged the patient or the treating doctor, or retained 
control of the patient’s treatment.135  Often formal consults involve a physician 
attempting to evaluate, diagnose, or treat a patient.136 
In Cogswell v. Chapman, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the 
ophthalmologist, who served as a courtesy/consulting physician at a hospital, 
entered into a physician-patient relationship with the infant patient.137  In 
Cogswell, a physician’s assistant called the consulting ophthalmologist on the 
telephone for advice regarding the infant patient.138 After asking the 
physician’s assistant a series of questions, the ophthalmologist advised him of 
treatment management, including rest, Tylenol, and the possible need of 
follow-up visits.139  The physician assistant relayed this information to the ER 
doctor who followed the ophthalmologist’s advice.140   
The court held that the ophthalmologist had more than an informal interest 
in the patient’s condition, and an issue of fact existed as to the level of 
involvement the ophthalmologist had in the patient’s treatment.141  The court 
noted that physical contact with the patient is not a requirement for a 
physician-patient relationship.142  The court also stated that if a physician 
advises a patient over the telephone, and it is foreseeable that the patient would 
 
 132. Id. at 307. 
 133. Id. at 307 
 134. Id. 
 135. Reynolds, 277 Ill. App.3d at 83, 87; Hill by Burston, 186 Mich. App. At 304, 306; St. 
John, 901 S.W.2d at 424; Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 306-307; Cogswell, 249 A.D. at 866-67; Bovara 
v. St. Francis Hosp., 700 N.E.2d 143, 148-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting 
Mem’l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 38-40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
 136. Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 715. 
 137. Cogswell, 249 A.D.2d at 865-67. 
 138. Id. at 865. 
 139. Id. at 865-66. 
 140. Id. at 865. 
 141. Id. at 867. 
 142. Id. at 866. 
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rely on that advice, an implied physician-patient relationship can exist.143  
Here, the ophthalmologist may have offered advice that would likely be 
followed since he had particular expertise in the field, and the ER doctor did 
not.144 
In Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Memorial Hospital, the court found that a 
physician-patient relationship was created when an on-call physician received 
information through a nurse’s phone call from the hospital regarding the status 
of a woman in labor.145  The on-call physician used this relayed information to 
conclude that the patient should be transferred to a hospital over ninety miles 
away.146  The patient began delivering the baby in breech before reaching the 
hospital and died due to suffocation.147  According to the court, the on-call 
physician established a physician-patient relationship with the patient because 
he evaluated the status of the patient’s labor and gave the approval for the 
patient’s transfer.148  Even though the doctor had no contact or connection with 
the patient other than one phone call from the nurse, the court relied on the fact 
that the doctor rendered his services to the patient and concluded he had a duty 
of care.149 
In Lection v. Dyll, the Texas Court of Appeals held the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of the physician.150  The court found 
genuine issues of fact existed as to whether a physician-patient relationship 
existed.151  In Lection, the on-call neurologist spoke with the hospital 
emergency room physician over the telephone.152  The consulting neurologist 
diagnosed the emergency room patient’s condition over the phone and told the 
ER doctor that no other treatment was necessary and the patient could leave the 
hospital.153  The court found that the consulting doctor stated his medical 
opinion as to the treatment of the patient and the ER doctor relied on the 
consultant’s expertise and advice.154  Therefore, summary judgment was 
precluded.155 
In Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., the Kansas Supreme Court found 
a physician-patient relationship existed between the physician and patient 
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although the physician did not speak directly with the patient, had not seen, 
talked to, or treated the patient in four years.156  In Adams, the patient’s mother 
contacted the family physician to seek advice about her pregnant daughter’s 
abdominal pain.157  The physician advised the mother to take her daughter to 
the emergency room if the pain worsened, and to see a doctor the next day.158  
The court found that the doctor’s “undertaking to render medical advice as to 
the patient’s condition gave rise to a physician-patient relationship.”159  The 
court reasoned that it was immaterial that the physician had not seen the patient 
for several years, did not speak directly with the patient, or that he no longer 
provided obstetrical care.160  The fact that the physician gave the mother his 
medical opinion over the phone gave rise to a physician-patient relationship.161  
The court further noted that even if the prior relationship between the daughter 
and physician had extinguished since the physician had not seen her for four 
years, the medical advice given to her mother had renewed a relationship.162  
The court distinguished this case from others because the doctor took some 
action to give medical assistance.163 
In Bovara v. St. Francis Hosp., the Illinois Appellate Court held that 
genuine issues of fact existed as to whether a physician-patient relationship 
existed.164  In Bovara, the court noted that a physician who provides a service 
for a patient may have a duty to the patient.165  In Bovara, the consulting 
physicians reviewed angiogram film and communicated to the cardiologist that 
the recipient was a candidate for coronary angioplasty.166  The patient died 
during the procedure.167  The court held the consulting physicians may have 
established a physician-patient relationship with the patient since they provided 
a service for the patient and should have known their medical opinion would 
be passed on to the patient.168 
Other courts have adopted clear-cut tests to determine when a consulting 
doctor may have a duty to the patient.  These cases often involve on-call 
doctors who have not physically examined a patient.  In Millard v. Corrado, 
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the Missouri Appellate Court held a physician-patient relationship can arise if 
the physician is contractually obligated to provide assistance in the patient’s 
diagnosis and treatment and does so.169  In an Ohio Appellate Court case, 
McKinney v. Schlatter, the court held “that a physician-patient relationship can 
exist by implication between an emergency room patient and an on call 
physician who is consulted by the patient’s physician but who has never met, 
spoken with, or consulted the patient when the on call physician (1) 
participates in the diagnosis of the patient’s condition, (2) participates in or 
prescribes a course of treatment for the patient, and (3) owes a duty to the 
hospital, staff or patient for whose benefit he is on call.”170  The Michigan 
Appellate Court recently adopted the McKinney test in Oja v. Kin.171 
Although the Millard and McKinney courts provided well-defined tests to 
determine when a physician-patient relationship exists, these tests apply only 
to physicians with contractual obligations.  Numerous state courts have begun 
to set forth criteria to enable one to distinguish between informal and formal 
consults, but a fuzzy line still exists between non-liability and a duty of care in 
may states.  In Irvin v. Smith the Kansas Supreme Court drew a solid line 
between non-liability and a duty of care, but in doing so nearly erased the 
consulting doctor’s duty of care. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
A. Majority Opinion 
In Irvin v. Smith, the Kansas Supreme Court asserted that one element of a 
medical malpractice claim is a duty of care, which exists only if a physician-
patient relationship is found.172  The court noted that the existence of a 
physician-patient relationship is a question often left to a jury.173  However, the 
court added that summary judgment may be proper if a jury could draw only 
one conclusion from the undisputed facts that no physician-patient relationship 
exists.174 
Once the court established that summary judgment could be proper, the 
court discussed the circumstances in which it and other courts have found such 
relationships to exist.175  First, the court cited the Missouri Court of Appeals by 
stating the relationship is generally created only where the physician 
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personally examines the patient.176  However, the court cited a number of 
cases, including one of its previous decisions, in which courts have found a 
physician-patient relationship even though the physician did not examine the 
patient but instead had merely indirect contact with the patient.177  Yet, the 
court noted that a physician-patient relationship is not created when a 
physician gives merely an “informal opinion” to the treating physician.178 
The court cited its 2001 decision in Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr. 
regarding the “foundational requirements for the existence of a physician-
patient relationship.”179  The court stated: 
A physician-patient relationship is consensual.  Thus, where there is no 
ongoing physician-patient relationship, the physician’s express or implied 
consent to advise or treat the patient is required for the relationship to come 
into being.  Stated otherwise, the doctor must take some affirmative action 
with regard to treatment of a patient in order for the relationship to be 
established.180 
After examining case history, the court analyzed Irvin’s argument.181  Irvin 
argued the facts show that Dr. Smith and Dr. Gilmartin engaged in a lengthy, 
detailed conversation about the condition, care, and treatment of Irvin.182  This 
conversation provided Dr. Gilmartin with a “complete picture of Ashley Irvin’s 
presentation,” and Dr. Gilmartin testified that he believed Irvin’s condition was 
stable.183  Dr. Gilmartin further testified that he “jointly developed a plan for 
the evaluation of Ashley Irvin” and assumed primary responsibility for 
performing the shuntogram on November 15, 1995.184  The Kansas Court 
noted certain facts it deemed important including: 1) Dr. Gilmartin was not an 
employee of the hospital; 2) Dr. Gilmartin was not on call the night he received 
a phone call from Dr. Smith; 3) Dr. Gilmartin never had involvement or 
contact with Ashley Irvin or her family prior to the November 14th call from 
Dr. Smith; and 4) Dr. Gilmartin had no contractual obligation to attend any 
patients at Wesley.185 
The court decided that Dr. Gilmartin had merely been asked to carry out a 
consultation on November 15, 1995.186  Further, the court stated that this 
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consultation on the 15th would be a “formal consultation” because it included 
a full bedside review and physical examination of the patient.187  The court 
stated that Dr. Gilmartin had not spoken with Irvin or her parents, reviewed her 
hospital chart, nor examined Irvin on the 14th.188  The court additionally 
placed great emphasis on the facts that Dr. Gilmartin was informed of Irvin’s 
condition only by his conversation with Dr. Smith, that Dr. Gilmartin did not 
enter any orders in Irvin’s case, and that he took no other action than 
discussing the case with Dr. Smith in general terms.189  Finally the court 
reasoned that telephone conversations like that between Smith and Gilmartin 
take place frequently in the medical field.190  Therefore, discouraging such 
conversations, by creating a relationship between the physician and the patient, 
would be adverse to the both the patients’ and public’s interests.191 
The court additionally cited numerous cases which have rejected the 
extension of a duty to physicians who provide informal consultations.192  The 
court cited the Illinois Appellate court which stated that finding a physician-
patient relationship in every conversation would “have a chilling effect upon 
the practice of medicine. It would stifle communication, education and 
professional association, all to the detriment of the patient.”193 
The Kansas Supreme Court analyzed a Michigan Appellate Court case, 
NBD Bank v. Barry, in which the court held a physician-patient relationship 
did not exist because the physician did not formally consult on the case.194  The 
court stated that the physician offered merely informal recommendations 
which the treating physician ‘“was free to accept or reject.”‘195  In NBD, the 
consultant did not contact or examine the patient and reviewed the patient’s 
chart only once.196  
The Kansas Supreme Court noted that an Illinois Appellate Court case, 
Reynolds v. Decatur Memorial Hosp., was similar to Irvin’s case and yet, the 
appellate court held there was no physician-patient relationship.197  In 
Reynolds, a pediatrician, Dr. Bonds, called Dr. Fulbright regarding a child 
patient with a high fever.  Dr. Fulbright inquired whether the child had a stiff 
neck, and after Dr. Bonds reporting that the child did, Dr. Fulbright 
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recommended a spinal tap be performed.198  From the procedure the patient 
had incurred a spinal cord injury, which left him permanently quadriplegic.199  
The appellate court decided Dr. Fulbright’s consultation was informal, and 
therefore no physician-patient relationship was created.200 
Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that Dr. Gilmartin did not 
have a physician-patient relationship with Irvin and that summary judgment 
was correctly granted in Gilmartin’s favor.201 
B. Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Lockett dissented from the majority’s opinion, contending the 
majority did not 
distinguish between the various types of physician consultants and instead 
excluded them all for public policy reasons.202  Judge Lockett disagreed with 
the majority’s statement that a formal consultation requires (1) a full bedside 
review of the case and (2) a physical examination of the patient.203  Lockett 
noted that the majority cited Millard v. Corrado for the proposition that 
“generally a physician-patient relationship requires a physician personally 
examining a patient,” but then acknowledged a contrary statement in Adams, a 
2001 Kansas Supreme Court case, to the effect that indirect contract doesn’t 
preclude a physician-patient relationship.204  Lockett criticized the majority for 
ignoring this prior Kansas case law and basing its decision on public policy.205 
Lockett argued that the majority failed to note the difference between an 
informal opinion and a formal opinion.206  Lockett asserted that a distinction 
should be made between consulting doctors who merely offer suggestions to a 
treating physician and those who aid the treating physician in formulating a 
treatment plan for the patient.207  Lockett found Irvin’s argument 
convincing.208  Irvin asserted that Dr. Gilmartin developed a plan for the 
evaluation of Irvin jointly with the treating physician, Dr. Smith, and Dr. 
Gilmartin agreed to assume primary responsibility for performing the 
shuntogram.209  Further, Irvin argued that Dr. Gilmartin engaged in a very 
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detailed conversation regarding the condition, care, and treatment of Irvin 
which gave Dr. Gilmartin a complete picture of Irvin’s presentation.210  
Therefore, Irvin argued this was not an informal consultation, but rather, a 
formal consultation which gave rise to a physician-patient relationship between 
Irvin and Dr. Gilmartin.211 
Lockett next examined the case law which the majority relied on in its 
opinion.  Lockett disagreed with the majority’s analysis of Reynolds.212  In 
Reynolds, the examining physician telephoned a second physician at home to 
seek advice in diagnosing a child.213  The only participation by the second 
physician in the treatment of the child was his suggestion that a particular test 
be conducted to rule out the child’s illness.214  The Illinois court held that this 
was merely an “informal opinion” and the second physician was just answering 
an inquiry from a colleague.215  Therefore, no physician-patient relationship 
existed.216 
Lockett did not agree that these facts were “strikingly similar” to Irvin’s 
case like the majority found.217  Instead, Lockett noted that the facts in Bovara 
v. St. Francis Hosp. were similar to Irvin’s case.218  In Bovara, the two 
consulting doctors reviewed an angiogram film and communicated to the 
cardiologist that the patient was a candidate for a coronary angioplasty.219  In 
Bovara the Illinois court limited its prior holding in Reynolds by stating that a 
physician-patient relationship may exist if the physician performs a service for 
the care and treatment of a patient.220  Further, the court decided a trier of fact 
may find that the doctors knew or should have known their medical opinion 
would be passed on to the patient and would be crucial to whether or not the 
angioplasty was performed.221 
The majority also relied on NBD Bank v. Barry in which the Michigan 
court found no physician-patient relationship because the consultations were 
merely informal.222  However, Lockett noted that the consulting physician in 
NBD Bank did not agree to treat the patient or to be a consultant on the case.223  
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Additionally, the attending physician was free to accept or reject the consulting 
doctors advice.224  Lockett distinguished NBD from Irvin because Dr. 
Gilmartin knew his advice would directly affect Dr. Smith’s course of 
treatment of Irvin.225  Additionally, Lockett noted that Dr. Gilmartin agreed to 
personally perform the shutogram.226  Further, Dr. Gilmartin performed the 
shutogram the following day which had a significant impact on Irvin’s 
injury.227 
Lockett found Diggs v. Arizona Cardiologists, Ltd., to be more 
persuasive.228  In Diggs, the emergency room physician consulted the 
cardiologist regarding a patient with severe chest pain.229  The patient was then 
released and died of a heart attack three hours later.230  The Arizona court 
found that the cardiologist was in the best position to rule out a myocardial 
infarction based on the echocardiogram because of his knowledge and 
expertise, and therefore owed a duty of care to the patient.231 
Lockett further noted that the Arizona court relied on the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 324A, which states: “One who undertakes, 
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is 
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting form his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking if (a) his failure to 
exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or . . . (c) the harm is 
suffered because of reliance of the other or third person upon the 
undertaking.”232 
The Arizona court found that the consulting doctor undertook to provide 
his expertise to the treating physician, knowing that it was necessary for the 
protection of the patient and that the treating physician would rely on it.233  The 
treating physician did not exercise an independent judgment to the patient’s 
diagnosis because he subordinated his professional judgment to that of the 
specialist.234  Therefore, the court held the consultant became the provider of 
medical treatment which gave rise to a duty of reasonable care.235 
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Finally, Lockett argued that the majority should not have characterized Dr. 
Gilmartin’s involvement as an informal consultation.236  Dr. Gilmartin and Dr. 
Smith both decided to perform the shuntogram the following day, which 
caused Irvin’s injuries.237  Further, Lockett stated that Dr. Gilmartin’s 
experience and expertise factored into the decision to delay the treatment.238  
Therefore, Lockett stated that the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
should be reversed and the facts should be submitted to the jury to determine 
whether a physician-patient relationship existed.239 
V.  COMMENT 
In recent years, courts have been finding ways to redefine the doctor-
patient relationship to allow plaintiffs greater access to claims against 
physicians.240  In Diggs v. Arizona Cardiologists, Ltd., the Arizona court used 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A to extend a duty of care to the 
consulting patient.241  In Millard v. Corrado, the Missouri Court of Appeals for 
the Eastern District of Missouri provided two avenues of recovery: (1) a 
traditional medical malpractice claim, even though the physician had no 
contact with the patient, and (2) a claim for general negligence based on public 
policy and the foreseeability of harm.242  In Tenuto v. Lederle Laboratories, the 
New York Court of Appeals held that a pediatrician owed parents a duty of 
care, based on common-law principles of ordinary negligence and malpractice, 
to warn them of their personal health risks from vaccination.243 
The recent holding by the Kansas Supreme Court in Irving v. Smith does 
not follow this trend in the case law across the country.  In Irving, the court 
limited a physician’s potential liability by limiting physician-patient 
relationships to those cases where a consulting doctor performs a full bedside 
review of the case, including a physical examination of the patient.244  
Although many courts have found physician-patient relationships only in cases 
where “formal” consultations occurred, these courts have not held such a 
narrow definition of “formal.”  Some courts have held that formal 
consultations arise when a physician attempts to evaluate, diagnose, or treat a 
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patient.  Additionally, courts find formal consultations when a doctor offers 
treatment advice that is likely to be accepted by the attending physician 
because of the consultant’s superior expert knowledge in a particular field.  
Other courts have found physician-patient relationships if the consulting doctor 
provided a service to the patient. 
Courts have invariably held that informal consultations do not give rise to 
physician-patient relationships.  In these cases, the physician often is just 
answering a colleague’s inquiry which can be accepted or rejected.  The 
consulting physician does not agree to and does not actually diagnose or treat 
the patient.  Often, the consultant is not paid and does not even know the 
patient’s name.  Further, the consulting physician has not retained control over 
the patient’s course of treatment.  Therefore, the physician’s low-level of 
involvement does not give rise to a duty of care.245 
In Irvin v. Smith, the majority ignored previous case law that had begun to 
draw the line between informal and formal consultations.246  Instead, the court 
offered a new definition: that a formal consultation must include a physical 
examination.247  Therefore, the majority diverged from prior case law which 
stated that direct physical contact is not always necessary in finding a 
physician-patient relationship.248  Judge Lockett, in his dissent, noted that the 
majority’s decision rested entirely on the public policy, that dissuading such 
consultations would be against the public’s interest.249 
Extending a physician-patient relationship to every telephone consultation 
between doctors would clearly be harmful to the public because it would limit 
doctors’ freedom to make informal inquiries to their colleagues.  However, 
holding a physician to a duty of care only when he or she engages in a physical 
examination of a patient is also harmful to the public’s interest.  When a 
physician engages in consultations that directly influence the treatment a 
patient will receive, the physician must be held to a certain standard of care.  
To avoid extending duties to physicians who answer mere inquiries, courts 
must clearly draw a distinction between formal and informal consultations. 
Judge Lockett’s dissent analyzed the case with the prior definitions of 
informal and formal consultations in mind.250  Lockett recognized that Dr. 
Gilmartin did more than just answer a mere inquiry from Dr. Smith.251  
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Instead, Dr. Gilmartin engaged in a lengthy conversation with Dr. Smith about 
the treatment Irving would receive.252  Dr. Gilmartin further agreed to perform 
the shuntogram the following day.253  Additionally, Dr. Gilmartin was a 
specialist who was contacted by Dr. Smith for his superior knowledge in this 
field.254  Finally, Dr. Gilmartin actually performed the shuntogram and surgery 
the following day.255 
Unlike previous cases in which courts have found informal consults, Dr. 
Gilmartin committed to further involvement in Irvin’s case, retained control 
over Irvin’s course of treatment, offered his medical opinion and services, and 
had superior knowledge as a child neurologist.  Additionally, Dr. Smith was 
not free to accept or reject Dr. Gilmartin’s recommendations because the two 
agreed to jointly formulate a plan to evaluate Irvin, and Dr. Gilmartin agreed to 
take full responsibility for performing the shuntogram.  Additionally, Dr. 
Smith was not making a mere inquiry to a colleague, but asking Dr. Gilmartin 
if he would join him in diagnosing and treating Irvin.  Therefore, Dr. 
Gilmartin’s involvement in this case was more than informal.  Even if there 
was a question of whether this involvement rose to the level of “formal,” this 
question should have been left for the jury to decide. 
The Kansas Supreme court has limited the extension of a physician-patient 
relationship to consulting doctors.  If other jurisdictions follow the holding in 
Irving, plaintiffs will be cut off from many claims that were once avenues for 
relief.  Hopefully, Kansas and other jurisdictions will limit Irving to its facts, 
but the case has still been a setback for plaintiffs in the medical malpractice 
field. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Kansas Supreme Court, in Irvin v. Smith, held that 
generally a physician-patient relationship is created only where the physician 
personally examines the patient.  Unlike several state courts in recent years that 
have expanded the theories under which a doctor may be held liable, the Irvin 
court limited a consulting doctor’s liability.  The Irving holding relieves 
consulting doctors of liability even though they may have had a large impact 
on the treatment, or lack of treatment, the patient received.  It remains to be 
seen whether other states will adopt the Irvin court’s reasoning and limit 
liability only to those doctors who directly examine the patient.  But for now, 
in Kansas, a plaintiff’s access to medical malpractice claims has been 
somewhat restricted. 
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